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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the notion of α-robust equilibrium for finite strategic players in anonymous
games, where utility of a player depends on other players’ actions only through the resulting distribution
of actions played. This equilibrium is defined as the set of strategies of the players such that no user
wants to deviate as long as N−α−1 number are playing the equilibrium strategies. We provide sufficient
conditions for the existence of this equilibrium. In addition, we prove a part of Berge’s Maximal Theorem
for correspondences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Von Neumann and Morgenstern defined the notion of saddle point equilibrium [1] for zero sum
games and Nash defined the notion of Nash equilibrium [2] for general games. Nash equilibrium
is defined as a set of strategies of the users such that if all other users play the equilibrium
strategy, then the user also plays an equilibrium policy and has no incentive to deviate. Thus
Nash equilibrium strategies of the players are defined as a fixed point of the best responses of
the players and its existence in finite games is proved using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [3].
Since then game theory has been developed as a powerful tool to model strategic interaction
both for static and dynamic settings.
In this paper, we consider the notion of α-robust Nash equilibrium defined as the set of
strategies of the players such that no user wants to deviate as long as N − α − 1 number
are playing the equilibrium strategies. Thus it is robust to up to α number of players playing
arbitrary strategies. This is motivated by users who are not necessarily rational or to accommodate
modeling errors. Such an equilibrium corresponds to the notion of an equilibrium’s defection
index as defined in [4]. Where the defection index of an equilbirium is defined as the smallest
number of defecting players which result in the other players wanting to change their actions.
In our terminology an equilibrium with a defection index of d is α-robust for α ≤ d − 1. As
pointed out in [4], this also has connections to other concepts in the literature such as the notion
of k-fault-tolerant equilibrium [5] and the level of resilience as used in [6].
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2We note that for α = 0, this boils down to the standard Nash equilibrium which exists for
any finite game. We refer the reader to [4] for numerous examples of games for which α-robust
equilibria exist when α > 0. It is also easy to construct examples of finite games for which α-
robust equilibria do not exist for any α > 0. For a given α > 0, a fundamental question is then
to provide conditions for when a α-robust equilibrium exists. This paper addresses this question.
Namely, we provide provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a α-robust equilibrium in
anonymous games [7] with finite action spaces and symmetric pay-offs. These are a class of
games in which each player’s pay-off does not depend on the identity of other players, but only
on the number of each player chosing a particular action. As pointed out in [7] such games arise
in many economic models and are a natural setting to study this equilibrium concept as one
can simply look at a fixed set of α players as deviating from the equilibrium, while in a more
general game the impact of α players deviating may vary depending on which set of players
deviates.
The paper is structured is as follows. In Section II, we define the model. In Section III, we
define the equilibrium concepts both for finite and infinite horizon players. In Section V, we
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium. We conclude in Section VI.
II. MODEL
Consider a game G(N ,A, u) where N is a set of N players, each with the same finite action
space A. Let each player i have the same utility u that depends on other players’ actions as
u(ai, f(a−i)) (1)
where ∀i, ai ∈ A is the action of player i, a−i is the set of actions of all players other than
i, and f(a−i) is the frequency distribution of a−i, i.e., this specifies the number of times each
action in A appears in a−i.
Let ∆(A) denote the set of probability distributions over A. A (mixed) strategy profile of the
game is given by σ = (σi)i∈N , where for each i, σ
i ∈ ∆(A) is a mixed strategy for player i.
III. EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT
For a given α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, divide the set of N players into a set of α defecting players
and a set of N−α normal players.1 For a given normal player i, let σ ∈ ∆(A)N−α−1 be a mixed
1Note that due to the symmetry of the game, it does not matter which set of players are in each of these sets and so the
following equilibrium defintion also hold if we do not specify which of the α player is defecting.
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3strategy profile of the otherN−α−1 normal players. We define an α-robust Nash equilibrium as a
strategy profile σ∗(α) = (σk,∗(α) ∈ ∆(A))k:|k|=N−α such that σi,∗(α) maximizes the expected utility
of player i, if the N−α−1 other normal players play according to σ−i,∗(α) = (σk,∗(α))k 6=i,|k|=N−α
and α players play arbitrary strategies, i.e.,
σi,∗(α) ∈
⋂
σ
argmax
σ¯i
E
σ¯i,σ−i,∗(α),σ,α[u(Ai, f(A−i))] (2)
where the above expectation is taken wrt σ¯i(ai)
∏
j 6=i,|j|=α σ
j(aj)
∏
k 6=i,|k|=N−α−1 σ
k,∗(α)(ak), and
σ = (σj)j 6=i,|j|=α, σ
−i,∗(α) = (σk,∗(α))k 6=i,|k|=N−α−1.
We note that each α−robust equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium.
IV. EXAMPLE
Consider an N player game of matching actions, where each player chooses an action from
the set {1, 2, 3}, such that a player’s utility is 1 if it plays action that is played by maximum
number of people. Thus
u(ai, f(a−i)) =


1 if ai = argmaxa∈{1,2,3} f(a
−i)
0 othwerwise .
(3)
Clearly all actions a ∈ {1, 2, 3} are pure strategy Nash equilibria and P (a = i) = 1/3 for i =
1, 2, 3 is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. We note that actions a = 1, 2, 3 are (N−1)/2−robust
whereas P (a = i) = 1/3 for i = 1, 2, 3 is only 1-robust.
V. EXISTENCE
It is known there always exists a Nash equilibrium for a finite game [2]. Thus there always
exists an α = 0 equilibrium. In this section, we ask the question, what are the values of α for
which there exists an α− robust Nash equilibrium. In the following, we discuss the existence
of such an equilibrium. Note that (2) can be written as
σ∗(α) ∈
⋂
σ
argmax
σ¯i
E
σ¯i,σ∗(α),σ,α[u(Ai, f(A−i))] (4)
∈
⋂
σ
argmax
σ¯i
∑
a
σ¯i(ai)
∏
j 6=i,|j|=α
σj(aj)
∏
k 6=i,|k|=N−α−1
σk,∗(α)(ak)u(ai, f(a−i)).
(5)
Note that in the above definition, since the utility of the player i does not depend on its index
i, the choice of defecting α− players doesn’t matter.
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4Let
BRi,α(σ, σˆ) = argmax
σ¯i
E
σ¯i,σ,σˆ,α[u(Ai, f(A−i))]
= argmax
σ¯i
∑
ai
σ¯i(ai)
∑
a−i
∏
j 6=i,|j|=α
σj(aj)
∏
k 6=i,|k|=N−α−1
σˆk(ak)u(ai, f(a−i))
= argmax
σ¯i
∑
ai
σ¯i(ai)ui,α(ai, σ, σˆ), (6)
where with some abuse of notation ui,α(ai, σ, σˆ) =
∏
j 6=i,|j|=α σ
j(aj)
∏
k 6=i,|k|=N−α−1 σˆ
k(ak)u(ai, f(a−i)).
Let
T i,α(σˆ) :=
⋂
σ
BRi,α(σ, σˆ) (7)
Hence, T i,α is the set of actions for player i, that are a best response to any mixed strategy
profile of the other players in which the the non-defecting players follow the profile σˆ and
the defecting players can select any mixed strategy profile. Using this definition the α-robust
equilibrium can be equivalently written as:
σ∗,(α) ∈ T α(σ∗,(α)). (8)
Theorem 1: If T α(σˆ) is non-empty for all σˆ, then there exists an α− robust equilibrium.
Proof:We first note that Eσ¯
i,σˆ,σ,α[u(Ai,max(A−i))] is linear in σ¯i, σ, σˆ. Since the maximiza-
tion is done over the probability simplex which is compact, this implies from Berge’s maximal
theorem [3] that BRi,α(σ, σˆ) is continuous in (σ, σˆ). Moreover, BRi,α(σ, σˆ) is convex valued
because of linearity of the objective function.
By similar arguments as above, and using a version of Berge’s maximal theorem for corre-
spondences (Theorem 2 proved in Appendix A), T α(σˆ) is upper hemi-continuous in σ which
implies it has the closed graph property. Moreover, ∀i, σˆ, T i,α(σˆ) are convex valued since BRi,α
are convex valued and intersection of convex sets is convex. The domain of T α is the probability
simplex which is non-empty, compact and convex. Thus, if ∀σˆ, T α(σˆ) is non-empty, this implies
using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [3] that there exists a fixed-point.
We note that in above Theorem, we could restrict σˆ to be in any non empty compact set (not
necessarily convex) S and as long as T α(σˆ) is non-empty for all σˆ in that set and T α : S → S,
there exists an α− robust equilibrium from Glicksberg Fixed-point Theorem [8]. In the following
lemma, we provide some sufficient conditions for the set T i,α(σˆ) to be non-empty. If we consider
the class of linear programs (corresponding to the best response of a player) whose objective is
parametrized by strategies of the defectors (and equivalently parametrized by their pure strategies)
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5then the optimum solution set doesn’t change by changing objective functions within this class.
This is guaranteed by sensitivity analysis of the considered linear programs.
Lemma 1: For some given a, let c := [u(ai, a, σˆ)]ai ,∆c := maxσ(c − [(u(a
i, σ, σˆ)]ai)) =
maxa(c − ([u(ai, a, σˆ)]ai)) and y = maxai u(a
i, a, σˆ). Then T i,α(σˆ) is non-empty if ∆c ≤
−(c− [11...1]Ty).
Proof: Note that T i,α(σˆ) is intersection of solutions of a class of linear programs defined
in (6), where changing σ changes the direction of the plane in a convex and continuous fashion.
The result is then implied from the sensitivity analysis of the linear program [9].
Remark 1 (Sufficient Condition): T i,α(σˆ) is non-empty if
[u(ai,σ,σˆ)]σ
norm([u(ai,σ,σˆ)]σ)
doesn’t change with
σ. This is because under this condition the orientation of the objective function doesn’t change
in the linear program in (6) and therefore BRi(σ, σˆ) is independent of σ. This is true for α = 0
case which is the Nash equilibrium.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for T i,α(σˆ) to be non-empty would be, where instead
of asking if the set of optimum solutions does not change by changing objective functions, as in
the above lemma, if the intersection of set of optimum solutions with respect to each objective
in this class is non-empty. We leave this as an open problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the notion of α− robust equilibrium for both finite strategic players
for anonymous games where no user wants to deviate as long as N −α− 1 number are playing
the equilibrium strategies. We provide sufficient conditions for existence of this equilibrium. In
addition, we prove an extension of part of Berge’s theorem for correspondences.
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APPENDIX A
Let X , Θ, and Y be topological spaces, f : X ×Θ⇒ Y be a continuous correspondence on
the product X ×Θ, and C : Θ⇒ X be a compact-valued correspondence such that C(θ) 6= ∅
for all θ ∈ Θ. Define the marginal function (or value function) f ∗ : Θ⇒ Y by
f ∗(θ) =
⋂
x∈C(θ)
f(x, θ) and the set of maximizers C∗ : Θ⇒ X by
C∗(θ) = {x ∈ C(θ) : f(x, θ) = f ∗(θ)}.2 .
2The following proofs are adapted from the proofs of Berge’s optimal theorem for functions.
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6Theorem 2: If f is upper hemicontinuous and C is upper hemicontinuous, nonempty and
compact-valued, then f ∗ is upper hemicontinuous.
Proof: Fix θ ∈ Θ , and consider a neighborhood W of f ∗(θ) and Wx of f(x, θ) such that
Wx ⊆W . For each x ∈ C(θ), there exists a neighborhood Ux × Vx of (θ, x) such that whenever
(θ′, x′) ∈ Ux × Vx, we have f(x, θ) ⊆Wx. The set of neighborhoods {Vx : x ∈ C(θ)} covers
C(θ), which is compact, so Vx1 , . . . , Vxn suffice. Furthermore, since C is upper hemicontinuous,
there exists a neighborhood U ′ of θ such that whenever θ′ ∈ U ′ it follows that C(θ′) ⊆
n⋃
k=1
Vxk .
Let U = U ′ ∩ Ux1 ∩ · · · ∩ Uxn . Then for all θ
′ ∈ U , we have f(x′, θ′) ∈ Wxk for each x
′ ∈ C(θ′),
as x′ ∈ Vxk for some k. It follows that
f ∗(θ′) =
⋂
x′∈C(θ′)
f(x′, θ′) ⊆
⋂
k=1,...,n
Wxk ⊆ W, which proves upper hemicontinuity of f
∗.
Theorem 3: If f is lower hemi-continuous and C is non empty and lower hemi-continuous,
then f ∗ is lower hemi-continuous.
Proof: Fix θ ∈ Θ. Let Wˆ be any open set such that f ∗(θ)
⋂
Wˆ 6= 0. By definition of f ∗, there
exists x ∈ C(θ) such that for any neighborhood W of f(x, θ), f ∗(θ) ⊆W . Thus W
⋂
Wˆ 6= ∅.
Now, since f is lower hemicontinuous, for every open set W ′ such that f(x, θ)
⋂
W ′ 6= ∅,
there exists a neighborhood U1 × V of (θ, x) such that whenever (θ
′, x′) ∈ U1 × V we have
f(x′, θ′)
⋂
W ′ 6= ∅. Observe that C(θ) ∩ V 6= ∅ (in particular, x ∈ C(θ) ∩ V ). Therefore, since
C is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a neighborhood U2 such that whenever θ
′ ∈ U2,
C(θ′) ∩ V 6= ∅. Let U = U1 ∩ U2. ConsiderW ′ = Wˆ . Then whenever θ
′ ∈ U , and ∀x′ ∈ C(θ′) ∩ V ,
f(x′, θ′)
⋂
Wˆ 6= ∅. Since f ∗(θ′) =
⋂
x∈C(θ′)
f(x, θ′) =
⋂
x∈C(θ′)∩V
f(x, θ′), f ∗(θ′)
⋂
Wˆ 6= ∅, which
proves the lower hemicontinuity of f ∗.
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